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The Bonds That Tie: Will a Performance
Bond Require that a Surety Deliver a
Certified Green Building?
Darren A. Prum* and Lorilee A. Medders**
As sustainable practices continue to sweep across the country, the federal, state,
and local governments chose to further encourage the construction industry
through various legislative and regulatory actions. In 2006, the city of
Washington, D.C. passed landmark legislation introducing green building
requirements for various types of structures into the jurisdiction over a five‐year
period. A noteworthy aspect of the legislation is that it directed construction
projects within the district to purchase green performance bonds up to $3
million to guard against a privately owned project’s failure to meet its green
building aspirations. Outside of the regulatory requirements associated with the
construction of a green building, lawsuits may also occur between the
participants of a project because the finished structure failed to attain a third
party certification. Given the need by project participants to address the risks
stemming from potential litigation issues or environmentally friendly
governmental policies, the question remains whether performance bonds will
provide sufficient coverage when a project fails to meet a sustainability
objective, or if a separate instrument is needed to address the specific perils
related to green buildings. This article seeks to address these issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the city of Washington, D.C. passed landmark legislation
introducing green building requirements for various types of
structures over a five‐year period.1 A noteworthy aspect of the
legislation is that it directed construction projects within the district to
purchase green performance bonds up to $3 million to guard against a
privately owned project’s failure to deliver on its green building
promises.2 In essence, this law placed the burden of compliance on the
contractors and sureties of a green building project.3
Following the passage of this act, confusion amongst the
construction industry and sureties ensued because a green
performance bond did not exist and no one knew how to obtain one.4
Responding to this legislation, the Surety and Fidelity Association of
America (“SFAA”) and the National Association of Surety Bond
Producers (“NASBP”) sent a joint letter to the government of the
District of Columbia outlining their concerns and explaining that they
anticipated great reluctance on the part of sureties to issue such
instruments despite the creation of market demand.5 No matter the
motivating source, this new requirement highlighted the need for some
type of guarantee against injuries arising from a contractor who did
not deliver a green building as promised.6
Outside of the regulatory requirements associated with the
construction of a green building, lawsuits may also occur between the
participants of a project because the finished structure failed to attain
a third party certification.7 Lawsuits may originate out of financial
1. Wash. D.C., Green Building Act of 2006 (codified as D.C. CODE §6‐1451‐05 (2008)).
2. Id. at § 6‐1451.05(f). In the event that the project failed to attain its third party
certification goals, the legislation stipulated that “[a]ll or part of the performance bond shall be
forfeited to the District and deposited in the Green Building Fund,” which the city planned to use
for technical assistance, education, and an incentive program. Id. at § 6‐1451.05(g).
3. Chris Cheatham, What’s Your Green Construction Strategy?, GREEN BUILDING LAW UPDATE
(Aug. 15, 2008) http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/uploads/file/DCBONDARTICLE
FINAL(1).pdf.
4. See Chris Cheatham, Green Performance Bonds Necessary but Risky, GREEN BUILDING LAW
UPDATE (June 2, 2011), http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/articles/legal‐developments/
surety.
5. Letter from Matthew Klimczak, Dir. of Underwriting, Sur. and Fid. Ass’n of Am. and Mark
McCallum, Gen. Counsel and Dir. of Gov’t Relations, Nat’l Ass’n of Sur. Bond Producers to Linda
Argo, Comm’r of Dep’t. of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Gov’t of D.C. (Aug. 13, 2007) (on file
with author).
6. Chris Cheatham, Green Performance Bonds Necessary but Risky, GREEN BUILDING LAW
UPDATE (June 2, 2011), http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/articles/legal‐developments/
surety.
7. See Darren A. Prum & Stephen Del Percio, Green Building Claims: What Theories Will a
Plaintiff Pursue, Who Has Exposure, and a Proposal For Risk Mitigation, 37 REAL ESTATE L.J. 243,
245 (2009) [Hereinafter referred to as Prum & Del Percio 1].
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incentives provided by many jurisdictions to encourage the
construction of green buildings8 or due to many other claim
possibilities available to an injured party.9 For example, a lawsuit
occurred when one project in Maryland failed to achieve its green
building objectives and did not qualify for the state’s financial
incentives.10 In that case, some type of contractual guarantee from a
surety could have provided accountability and a resolution of the
green building issue without the need for legal action.
Given the need for project participants and those associated with
environmentally friendly governmental policies, the question remains
whether performance bonds will provide sufficient coverage when a
project fails to meet a sustainability objective, or if a separate
instrument is needed to address the specific risks related to green
buildings. This article seeks to address these issues. Section II
presents an explanation of surety bonds and some of the motivating
factors. It begins with an in‐depth discussion of a performance bond
and the applicable parties. The examination continues with an
evaluation of the claims and defenses of a surety before turning to the
regulatory environment.
In Section III, we examine the various issues on a green building
project from an owner and surety’s perspectives. This analysis
includes the validity of a performance bond and third party indemnity
claims as well as the issues surrounding default based on standard
construction and green designs.
In Section IV, we explore and analyze the contract surety language
used in the performance bond forms offered by the American Institute
of Architects (“AIA”), the Engineers Joint Contracts Document
Committee (“EJCDC”), and ConsensusDOCS. In evaluating the various
forms, we also consider ancillary documents like ConsensusDOCS’
Green Building Addendum along with the SFAA and NASBP’s
recommendations for the inserting language in a green building
project to eliminate the risk on sureties. Finally, we put forward a
proposal in Section V for all participants in a green building project
with regard to the handling of performance bonds after carefully
considering the pressing issues from both an owner and surety’s
perspective.

8. See generally Darren A. Prum, Creating State Incentives for Commercial Green Buildings:
Did the Nevada Experience Set an Example or Alter the Approach of Other Jurisdictions?, 34 WM &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 171 (2009) [Hereinafter referred to as Prum ELPR].
9. See Prum & Del Percio 1, supra note 7.
10. See Shaw Dev., LLC v. S. Builders, Inc., No.: 19‐C‐07‐011405 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2008).
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II. EXPLANATION OF SURETY BONDS
The underpinnings of the construction industry continually reveal
performance volatility by many contractors and thus require some
mechanism to protect an owner against a project failing to finish.11
One of the easiest and cost effective solutions to reduce this type of
threat is to purchase a performance bond to assuage the owner’s
concerns.12 In the United States, the performance bond routinely
serves as the main instrument for the construction industry to
minimize these inherent risks.13
While a private developer determines its risk tolerance and need
for a construction bond, the federal and many state governments
require one as a matter of statute.14 On the federal level, the Miller Act
compels contract surety bonds on construction projects.15 This
legislation requires a contractor to post a bond on performance and
one on labor and material payment when the contract award exceeds
$100,000.16
Following the footsteps of the federal government, many states
11. JUSTIN SWEET, MARC M. SCHNEIER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 32.04 (8th Ed., 2009); David J. Barru, How to Guarantee Contractor
Performance on International Construction Projects: Comparing Surety Bonds With Bank
Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 51, 59 (2005). When
considering the volatility in the construction industry, the commentators explain that many
threats occur towards an owner’s goal of completing a project unscathed by contractor
performance issues. Sweet & Schneier, supra, § 32.04. These contractor related issues may
emanate from management and supervision sources or out of the financial realm. Id. Frequently,
a contracting company relies heavily on the competence of a small number of employees, which
can quickly turn into disaster if these individuals become unavailable. Id. Other times, a poor or
difficult estimate or a streak of money losing projects can cause severe financial crises or even
bankruptcy. Id. In addition, the difficulties in obtaining credit or insurance policies for the
various risks may place a contractor on the financial edge.
12. A performance bond is not the sole solution; but given the further analysis on how
constructing a green building differs from a standard one, it provides the main area of suretyship
where difficulties will occur. Other types of construction bonds include: a Bid Bond where the
guarantor will pay the damages incurred should a successful bidder refuse to perform; a Payment
Bond where the issuer agrees to make sure all subcontractors and supplier receive their
appropriate compensation; a Subcontractor Bond where the prime contractor receives an
assurance from a responsible third party for payment of lower tiered subcontractors or suppliers;
a Bond to dissolve a mechanics’ lien from clouding an owner’s title; and a Warranty Bond to
provide assurances based on any warranties given by a contractor. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra
note 11, § 32.04‐32.09.
13. See Barru, supra note 11, at 57. In other parts of the world, the construction industry
uses bank guarantees and standby letters of credit to resolve the same issue. Id. at 56.
14. Cheryl S. Kniffen, A Georgia Practitioner’s Guide to Construction Performance Bond Claims,
60 MERCER L. REV. 509, 514–15 (2009).
15. 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131‐34 (West 2012).
16. 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b). The federal government requires a payment bond in order to
guarantee the subcontractors and suppliers compensation for services rendered because of their
inability to lien a public work. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.04.
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have also enacted statutes called “Little Miller Acts” with differing
contract award thresholds but containing many of the equivalent
requirements.17 In turn, local governments take the identical approach
in housing development laws to guard against a developer’s failure to
make promised improvements.18
As such, the use of construction bonds in both public and private
projects across the country plays an integral role in guaranteeing the
completion of a development while minimizing the amount of risk to
an owner.
A. PERFORMANCE BONDS
A performance bond provides an owner of a development with
financial backstop against a contractor’s ability to complete a given
project.19 A surety then provides contractual assurance to an owner
(the bond obligee) should the bonded contractor (the principal)
default.20 The guarantee covers situations where the bonded service
17. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 39‐1‐1 (2011); ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.25.010, 36.26.020, 36.25.025
(2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 34‐22, 34‐223, 34‐224 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 22‐9‐401 to 22‐9‐405
(2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24‐105‐201 to 24‐105‐203, 38‐26‐101, 38‐26‐105 to 38‐26‐110
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 49‐41 to 49‐43 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 6962 (2011); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 2‐201.01 to 2‐201.11 (2011); FL. STAT. 255.05 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13‐10‐1 to 13‐10‐
2, 13‐10‐40 to 13‐10‐65, 36‐91‐1 to 36‐91‐2, 36‐91‐40, 36‐91‐70 to 36‐91‐95 (2011); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 103D‐323 to 103D‐325 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 54‐1025 to 54‐1930 (2011); 30 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 550/0.01 to 550/3 (2011); IND. CODE §§ 4‐13.6‐7‐5 to 4‐13.6‐7‐12, 5‐16‐5.5‐1 to 5‐16‐
5.5‐8 (2011); IOWA CODE §§ 573.1 to 573.27, 616.15 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16‐1901 to 16‐
1908, 60‐1110, 60‐1112, 68‐410, 68‐521, 68‐527 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45A.185,
45A.190, 45A.195, 45A.225 to 45A.265, 45A.430 to 45A.440, 341.317 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. §§
38:2181 to 38:2247, 48:250 to 48:256.12 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 871 (2011); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 17‐101 to 17‐111 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 29 (2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 129.201 to 129.212, 570.101 to 570.105 (2011); MINN. STAT. §§ 574.26 to 574.32
(2011); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 31‐5‐51 to 31‐5‐57, 31‐5‐25 to 31‐5‐31 (2011); MO. REV. STAT.
§§107.170, 227.100, 227.600, 227.633, 229.050, 229.060, 229.070, 522.300 (2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 18‐2‐201 to 18‐2‐208 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 52‐118 to 52‐118.02 (2011); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 339.015 to 339.065 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 447:15 to 447:18 (2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:44‐143 to 2A:44‐148 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13‐4‐18 to 13‐4‐20 (2011); N.Y. STATE
FIN. LAW § 137 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A‐25 to 44A‐35 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
48‐01.2‐01, 48‐01.2‐09 to 48‐01.2‐12, 48‐01.2‐23 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 153.54 to 153.581
(2011); OKLA STAT. tit. 61 §§ 1, 2, 13, 15, 112 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 279C.380 to 279C.390,
279C.515, 279C.600 to 279C.625 (2011); 8 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 191 to 202 (2011); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
22, §§ 47 to 58 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 37‐12‐1 to 37‐12‐11 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11‐35‐3030
(2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 5‐21‐1 to 5‐21‐8 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12‐4‐201 to 12‐4‐206
(2011); TEXAS PROP. CODE §§ 53.231 to 53.237 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 14‐1‐18 to 14‐1‐20, 38‐
1a‐501, 63G‐6‐504 to 63G‐6‐507 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit., 19 § 10; tit., 16 § 3448 (2011); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.2‐4336 to 2.2‐4342 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 39.08.010 to 39.08.100 (2011); W.
VA. CODE §§ 5‐22‐1, 5‐22‐2, 38‐2‐39 (2011); WIS. STAT. §§ 779.14, 779.15 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16‐6‐101 to 16‐6‐121 (2011).
18. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.04.
19. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.06.
20. PETER S. BRITELL, GREEN BUILDINGS: LAW, CONTRACT AND REGULATION § 10.08 (1st Ed. Law
Journal Press 2010).
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provider fails to completely accomplish the underlying construction
agreement conditional on the penal limit of the bond.21
From a practical perspective, two contracts coexist to create the
unique surety arrangement in the construction setting.22 The first
contract covers the construction project and binds the contractor with
either the owner or general contractor, while the second agreement is
for the performance bond.23 This second agreement brings three
parties together: the owner, the contractor, and the surety, such that
an obligation inures to guarantee completion of work committed under
the first contract.24
Moreover, the performance bond will contain limitations to the
surety’s financial exposure or penal amount. Depending on the
circumstances, the surety will issue the bond at 50 percent or 100
percent of the service provider’s agreed upon price with the project
owner.25 On federal projects, the contracting officer for the given
procurement will ultimately determine the proper amount to protect
the government’s interest;26 and in some cases, where a statutory bond
becomes necessary under state or local law, the code will dictate a
specific amount of coverage.27
To provide oversight and help ensure credibility, the U.S.
Department of Treasury maintains regulations that determine
qualification for federal projects and the state governments provide
The government
supervision of the surety companies as well.28
usually regulates the costs of a performance bond, which is calculated
as a percentage of the penal limit.29 Depending on the financial
capability of a given surety, a limit will be determined on the size of a
bond it can issue.30 Many sureties try to balance their exposure by
placing dollar limits on a given project; and sometimes in larger

21. See Barru, supra note 11, at 57.
22. See J. Harry Cross, Suretyship Is Not Insurance, 30 INS. COUNS. J. 235, 236–37 (1963).
23. Id. at 236.
24. Id.
25. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.06. Sometimes, the courts will hold a surety
liable for a sum above the amount issued for the bond. Some of the situations that create this type
of liability on a surety occur when it assumes responsibility for construction, it financially
supports a contractor, it acts in bad faith, or it receives a directive to disburse prejudgment
interest on a bond claim. See Barru, supra note 11, at 60.
26. Ceclia Carson, A Lawyer’s View of Performance Bond Sureties: Protecting The Government’s
Interest When Dealing With Performance Bond Sureties Of Defaulted Contracts, A LAWYER’S VIEW
(U.S. Dep’t of Comm. Dec. 20, 1992), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/contracts/cld/LV/
Suretey.pdf.
27. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.06. These commentators note that the
statutory bond level in some jurisdictions require coverage at 50 percent of the contract price. Id.
28. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(I).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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projects, they split the risk or reinsure a portion of the coverage.31
In addition, both public and private owners of projects need to
satisfy certain common law requirements for a “facially” regular or
valid contract.32 To satisfy the statute of frauds, a performance bond
must be in writing;33 to avoid the equal dignity rule in agency law, the
power of attorney for the bond needs to be written and must convey
the proper authority for the specific guarantee being made.34
Thus, a well understood and executed performance bond provides
the owner of a construction project a viable risk management tool in
an environment where there is a high likelihood a contractor will
default on its obligations and fails to perform as anticipated.
1. Reimbursements of the Surety
Historically, a surety did not consider itself an insurer, which
means it would not expect to take a loss on a claim.35 With this in
mind, a surety will seek certain protections through the bond language
prior to issuance in order to minimize its risk of loss.36 For example,
the principal will usually need to indemnify the surety.37 By taking
such an action, the surety shifts all possible claims made upon the
bond back to the principal.38 Building on this principle, some courts
have even extended this language to also include the settlement of
claims regardless of the contractor’s liability.39
However, this right of indemnity held by the surety may provide
little relief should the defaulting principal lack the capacity to
reimburse.40 In these cases, the surety usually turns to the obligee or

31. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(I).
32. See Kniffen, supra note 14, at 515.
33. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19.2 (4th Ed. 1998).
34. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §12 (3d. Ed. 2001). One
commentator explains an illustration where a performance bond gets issued at a $175,000 penal
amount, but the power of attorney only gave authority up to $150,000. See Kniffen, supra note 14,
at 515. She then explains that the bond fails because the law presumes that the obligee (owner)
received notice that the power of attorney overstepped its authority. Id.
35. See Cross, supra note 22, at 236.
36. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(H).
37. See Cross, supra note 22, at 237. The author further quoted a U.S. Supreme Court decision
that remarked, “Traditionally sureties compelled to pay debts for their principal have been
deemed entitled to reimbursement, even without a contractual promise such as the surety here
had. And probably there are few doctrines better established than that a surety who pays the
debt of another is entitled to all the rights of the person he paid to enforce his right to be
reimbursed.” Id. (quoting Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132,136‐7 (1962)). Another
commentator explains that sureties usually include the principal, the principal’s owners, spouses
of owners, or other key personnel as part of the general agreement of indemnity. See Kniffen,
supra note 14, at 513.
38. See Kniffen, supra note 14, at 511.
39. See generally Gulf Ins. Co. v. AMSCO, Inc., 153 N.H. 28 (2005).
40. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(H).
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owner as a source with funds to satisfy its claim.41
Based on the circumstances, the surety may request direct
payments from the owner when the general contractor defaults, or
when the retainage used for security purposes becomes available.42
The courts tend to support this direct payment mechanism for
reimbursement and eschew the notion that the surety’s actions
become an impermissible interference between the contractor and
owner of a project.43
Other times, when a surety seeks the retainage from an insolvent
general contractor, it must contend with other creditors, any
government entities with a claim, and the bankruptcy trustee.44 As a
result, the owner usually transfers the undisputed retainage to the
court handling the bankruptcy, allowing the parties to battle each
other to garner their share from the judge making the distributions.45
Depending on the type of bond, a surety may find itself with
superior rights over other claimants.46 In the performance bond
situation, a surety may obtain subrogation rights since it was required
to fulfill a principal’s obligation by either finishing the work itself,
engaging a substitute provider, or supporting the contractor
financially.47 When this occurs, courts hold that a surety maintains
superior rights on retainage claims over all other claimants except
those by the government.48
Hence, this unique characteristic of the bonding contract sets the
surety apart from traditional insurance while placing it at the center of
any possible performance controversy occurring within the project.
2. Surety Responsibilities
Considering the surety’s responsibility in this unique position as a
financial backstop, some scholars point out the importance of
remembering the context of the arrangement.49 They begin with
noting that a surety’s responsibility is no greater than that of the
41. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(H).
42. Id. According to these commentators, they define retainage as, “a contractually created
security system under which the owner retains a specified portion of earned progress payments
to secure itself against certain risks.” (Id. § 22.03)
43. See, e.g., Gerstner Elec., Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 520 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1975).
44. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(H).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. RLI Ins. Co. v. New York Dep’t of Labor, 97 N.Y.2d 256 (2002). This same principle does
not necessarily hold true for payment bond situations. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, §
32.10(H). In those cases, the surety obtains subrogation rights for the subcontractors and
suppliers, which does not surpass the government but may be superior to an owner or general
contractor. Id.
49. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(D).
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principal (contractor) to the obligee (owner) and that the penal
amount of the bond provides the financial limitation.50 Furthermore,
the language of the bond dictates much of the performance and
limitations, while the surety maintains no obligation to act until the
owner declares a breach and serves proper notice.51
With these premises in mind, the courts create a distinction
between a project with difficulties and one that creates an obligation
on the surety based on the need to follow the language contained in the
bonding instrument.52 In those qualifying instances when performance
becomes necessary, the language of the bond will determine the
surety’s explicit responsibilities. One option available to the surety is
to provide financial assistance to the principal so that a contractor may
complete its obligations without the burden of insolvency.53 Another
alternative for a surety pressed into performance may consist of
providing a replacement contractor to complete the remaining
commitments.54
Finally, the surety may “buy the bond back” by negotiating with
the owner to complete the contractor’s duties in exchange for a
monetary settlement.55 This typically occurs when the surety
determines that the costs to complete the project far exceed those
liabilities remaining on the bond.56 However, the courts maintain that
a surety must act affirmatively and not eschew its responsibilities.57
The surety may not force the obligee to complete performance on its
own and then offer to make reimbursements at a reasonable cost
because of its lack of ability to make a decision when pressed into
performance.58
In addition, the issuance of other construction related bonds may
affect a surety’s responsibilities.59 An example of this type of situation
occurs when a payment bond gets issued as part of the construction
project.60 In those instances, the payment of the principal’s suppliers
and the subcontractor including its vendors will not be entitled to
receive payment under the performance bond.61
Accordingly, the surety’s responsibilities with regard to
50. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(D).
51. Id.
52. See generally Bank of Brewton, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 827 So. 2d 747 (Ala. 2002).
53. See Barru, supra note 11, at 57.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Fortune Constr. Co., 320 F.3d 1260, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003).
58. Id.
59. See Barru, supra note 11, at 58.
60. Id. Of course, the specific language of the performance bond issued by a given surety will
dictate the application of this type of situation.
61. Id.
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performance and its limitations need careful consideration by an
owner looking to limit the risk associated with its project.
B. ASSERTING CLAIMS
In order to assert a claim against a surety, the claimant must
satisfy three requirements. First, he must show he has standing to
pursue a claim.
Second the claimant must satisfy the time
requirements by showing a sequence of triggering events had occurred
before bring a suit. Finally, he must make a formal declaration of
default to provide the appropriate notice when pressing the surety into
action. As such, all of these issues need consideration by the parties
entering into a performance bond agreement.
1. Standing
Since a performance bond designates obligees, only those parties
named in the document receiving the guarantee can invoke a claim. In
a private development situation, the owner of a project or a contractor
seeking coverage on a subcontractor will generally not face an obstacle
since the principal and surety made them an obligee upon issuance.62
Nevertheless, the current practice of linking multiple parties
contractually makes the determination of who can assert a claim in the
construction context more complicated.63
In the past, many courts evaluated the similar scenario where
either a co‐prime contractor or a subcontractor brought a claim on a
performance bond as an intended or third party beneficiary.64 The
majority of courts in these cases repetitively explained that the
bonding document showed no evidence that the plaintiff’s claims were
contemplated when drafted and denied the claim for relief.65 A small
minority of courts, however, accepted the intended or third party
beneficiary claim under limited circumstances.66
62. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(A). While this seems straight forward, the
initial forays to sort through the standing issues dealt with the predecessor instrument called a
“faithful performance bond.” Id. This combined a performance and payment bond into a single
agreement and forced the courts to establish the right of a party to sue on the bond other than the
oblige. Id. In response to the doctrine instituted by the courts, the industry changed its approach
to the present day practice of issuing two separate bonds. Id.
63. Id.
64. Church of Jesus Christ v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 95 P.2d 736 (Utah 1939); VanCor
Inc. v. American Cas. Co., 208 A.2d 267 (Pa. 1965); Novak & Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 392
N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); J. Louis Crum Corp. v. Alfred Lindgren, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 544
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978); M.G.M Constr. Corp. v. N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth., 532 A.2d 764 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987); Moore Constr. Co., Inc. v. Clarksville Dep’t. of Elec., 707 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1985) aff’d Mar. 24, 1986.
65. See cases cited supra note 64.
66. Hanberry Corp. v. State Bldg. Comm’n., 390 So.2d 277 (Miss. 1980); Amelco Window
Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 317 A.2d. 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974). A later New Jersey court
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Likewise, an Illinois court examined a situation where an
authorized public entity contracted for construction services on behalf
of the ultimate governmental user and owner of the project.67 The
contractor’s agreement delineated the beneficiary of the project as the
ultimate user and owner, while the performance bond incorporated
the construction contract into its language.68 In resolving this
situation, the Illinois court denied an attempt by the beneficiary to
assert a claim for performance because the bond’s language specified
that only the entity named as an obligee could maintain an action to
compel the surety’s guarantee.69
Solving a similar issue, a Georgia court considered a case where a
lender provided financing to an owner on a specific project and
required obligee status as part of its agreement.70 In turn, the lender
attempted to make a claim under the performance bond; however, the
court found that the lender only obtained the status of an assignee to
the obligee instead of a successor.71 This clarification allowed the court
to hold that the language of the bond explicitly limited standing to sue
to the obligee or its successors, which denied the lender’s ability to
make a claim.72 As a result, a party looking to make a claim against a
surety must verify that the performance bond specifically names it as
an obligee or risk an adverse judgment from a court using a strict
contract construction approach.
2. Time Requirements
Equally important, the claimant must also pay attention to the
time requirements specified in the contractual language in order to
make a claim against a performance bond. If the bond is government
mandated, then the statutes will usually dictate when and where the
notices must occur.73
In the federal government environment, the contracting officer
will notify the contractor and interested parties of terminations for

followed the majority and distinguished this approach. See M.G.M Constr. Corp., 53 A.2d at 770.
In its opinion, the court further clarified that the earlier decision arose out of a situation where
the language creating the guarantee intertwined both a payment and performance component
into a single paragraph of the document. Id. If noted that the statute that created the bonding
requirement and the language used in the document at issue did not show an intent to create
standing with “non‐party co‐primes.” Id. at 774.
67. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 15, DuPage Cnty. v. Fred L. Ockerlund, Jr. & Assoc., Inc., 519
N.E.2d 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
68. Id. at 97–98.
69. Id.
70. TRST Atlanta, Inc. v. 1815 The Exch., 469 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
71. Id. at 240.
72. Id.
73. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(G).
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cause pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations.74 The first step
begins with a “cure notice” where a contractor receives a 10‐day
warning to resolve any issues identified as problematic by the
government.75 Besides the contractor, the government will also
furnish a copy of the notice to the surety, so that it may decide on
whether to make arrangements to complete the work.76
Should the contractor not remedy the deficiencies, the contracting
officer may issue a notice of default for failure to cure after the time
period elapses.77 Meanwhile, the surety may elect to complete the
contract for the principal after receiving the cure notice.78 In these
cases, the surety and the government enter into a takeover agreement
that details the terms and conditions for performance.79
In the private development situation, two different time periods
may effect the notice requirements in a performance bond. This may
occur when satisfying any condition precedents in the bond, like cure
notices, or by not delaying too long so as to avoid any limitation period
for a claim that discharges performance.
Often, the language contained in the performance bond will
specify the number of days and manner needed to place the principal
and surety on notice to cure the defects and create a condition
precedent under the contract. When the obligee fails to follow these
requirements, the courts will discharge the surety’s obligations and
bar recovery.80 In cases where the language lacks specificity with
respect to these requirements, the courts follow the opposite approach
and allow recovery from the obligee.81
74. 48 C.F.R. § 49.4 (2010). The Federal Acquisition Regulations emanate from a collective
effort by the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to provide guidance when acquiring goods and services
and are available for use by other executive agencies. See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN.,
REGULATORY REFERENCE OVERVIEW, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/21220 (last visited Sept.
19, 2011).
75. 48 C.F.R. § 49.402‐3(d) (2010).
76. 48 C.F.R. § 49.402‐3(h) (2010).
77. 48 C.F.R. § 49.402‐3(d) (2010). Interestingly, a commentator points out that the
contracting officer needs to proceed cautiously when terminating a contract under a default
situation because several boards of contract appeals held the government liable for “appropriate
and reasonable costs” under the takeover agreement with a surety. See Carson, supra note 26.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Town of Greenfield, 370 F.3d 215, 219‐20 (1st Cir. 2004); Nat’l
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 436, 436–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
81. See RLI Ins. Co. v. St. Patrick’s Home for the Infirm & Aged, 452 F. Supp. 2d 484, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Dooley & Mack Constructors, Inc. v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 972 So.2d 893
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). In the RLI Insurance Company case, the court examined the totality of the
language from a bond using a form document and determined it lacked the requirement to serve
written notice to the surety, which made the claim enforceable. RLI Ins. Co., 452 F. Supp. 2d at
488. This article will further explore the issues associated with using a form document in a later
section.
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Depending on the jurisdiction, statutory requirements and court
procedures may also provide either a floor or ceiling on the length of
time a claimant has to file the claim. One court reasoned that allowing
a surety to contractually reduce the statutory timeframe stipulated in
the law was unconscionable and that it would reasonably permit
longer periods if asked to do so.82 Another court took the opposite
approach and allowed a shorter period than stipulated in the language
of the performance bond even though a statutory provision permitted
a longer timeframe.83 Providing a third interpretation, a different court
upheld language from a form contract that created a two‐year
restriction to bring forward a claim after the final payment on the
construction contract as acceptable because the claimant specifically
required the performance bond and knew of the limitation.84
Thus, the time requirements play a crucial role in notifying the
appropriate parties of deficiencies and default so that a court does not
have to make a determination that causes a surprising outcome.
3. Declaration of Default
Finally, the formal declaration of default by the obligee serves as
an important point of no return for a surety because its relationship
with all parties involved in the construction project dramatically
changes after the assertion.85 This act by the obligee immediately
transforms the surety’s obligations86 from a passive participant to an
active one in the construction project. It entitles the surety to any
retainage and unpaid balances on the construction agreement because
its contractual duties require it to make payments to all laborers and
material‐men in order to discharge the principal’s obligations.87
Because the declaration of default prompts such serious
consequences, this decision and notice requires the owner to do so in a
“sufficiently clear, direct, and unequivocal” manner.88 This means the
magnitude of the action requires such specificity that would otherwise
create a situation where very few sureties would agree to accept the
possibility of unknown liabilities associated with a construction
agreement.89
Furthermore, there is no defining point at which a surety may get
82. City of Weippe v. Yarno, 486 P.2d 268, 270 (Idaho 1971).
83. Rumsey Elec. Co. v. Univ. of Del., 358 A.2d 712, 714 (Del. 1976).
84. Gateway Commc’n, Inc. v. John R. Hess, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 595, 599 (W. Va. 2000).
85. L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Serv., Inc., 17 F.3d 106, 111 (5th Cir. 1994).
86. See Zoby v. U.S., 364 F.2d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1966); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lester Bros., Inc.,
203 Va. 802, 807 (VA. 1962); Howell v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 69 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.
1934).
87. Henningsen v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404, 411 (1908).
88. L & A Contracting Co., 17 F.3d at 111 (5th Cir. 1994).
89. Id.; Elm Haven Constr. Ltd. P’ship v. Neri Constr. LLC, 376 F.3d 96, 99‐100 (2nd Cir. 2004).
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involved in the construction project. Absent a unilateral right to
intervene, the surety faces a situation where any actions it takes to
avoid a default may serve as the basis for a lawsuit by a contractor.90
In the few instances when a surety chose to get involved with the
performance of the construction contract prior to the declaration of
default, the contractors pursued legal action under a wrongful
interference claim in torts.91
However, a federal court in Illinois noted the lack of legal support
for such a claim in its decision when it stated that the defendant “failed
to cite a single case of a payment bond surety being subjected to
liability from its principal for interceding in the principal's contract
with the obligee before the obligee declared the principal in default.”92
While a lack of historical success shows the difficulty in pursuing the
claim, it does provide a warning to the surety that it may end up in a
factual scenario where a court decides a case differently or may suffer
great legal costs in addition to those associated with a construction
project defending such a lawsuit.
In addition, the declaration of default may place the surety in the
difficult position of having to choose between the obligee and the
contractor. Should the surety later determine that the obligee’s
declaration of default was in error, the courts will allow a piercing of
the bond’s penal sum due to the breach of duty if a cost increase
occurs.93 However, when the opposite occurs, and the surety affirms
the obligee’s decision to declare default, the contractor may file a claim
based on a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.94 In
such a situation, one court supported the business judgment of the
surety, provided that the underlying decision came out of dealings in
good faith.95 The court also rebuffed a contractor’s argument that
precluded a surety from settling the obligee’s claims prior to the

90. See L & A Contracting Co., 17 F.3d 106, 111 n. 15 (quoting ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, ET AL.,
Representing the Performance Bond Surety, in CONSTRUCTION DEFAULTS, § 5.2 (1989)).
91. See e.g., Gerstner Elec., Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 520 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1975); Nat’l Surety
Corp. v. Prairieland Constr., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (E.D. Mo. 2004); U.S. ex rel. James Cape &
Sons Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24212 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2004).
92. U.S. ex rel. James Cape, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24212, at *14.
93. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v. Prince George’s Cnty, 92 Md.App. 528 (1992); Riva Ridge
Apartments v. Robert G. Fisher Co., 745 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1987).
94. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aventura Eng’g & Constr. Corp., 534 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1306 (S.D.Fla.
2008).
95. Id. at 1312–13. In making its decision, the court explained, “This situation places the
surety in an unacceptable dilemma: if it does not honor the claim on the bond, the owner sues the
surety and the surety incurs the cost of litigation and of a potential judgment. On the other hand,
if the surety honors or settles the claim on the bond, the principal sues under a bad faith theory in
an attempt to avoid its obligation to indemnify the surety and the surety once again has to absorb,
or at least advance, the cost of the litigation and a potential judgment. This lose‐lose situation is
not a reasonable interpretation of the Indemnity Agreement or the Bond.” Id. at 1312.
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resolution of pending litigation determining whether the declaration of
default occurred appropriately.96
Accordingly, a surety must proceed carefully when getting
involved in the construction project or possibly face legal action from
the contractor for tortious interference with a contract; but when it
receives a clear, direct, and unequivocal declaration of default from the
owner, a significant chain of events follows.
As such, an owner looking to a surety to provide a financial
backstop for a project needs to pay special attention to the notice
requirements to avoid any unanticipated difficulties with asserting a
claim, while likewise, ensuring the bond both properly names the
obligees in its language and recognizes the requirements and serious
legal consequences of declaring a default against a contractor.
C. SURETY DEFENSES
Beyond the procedural and contractual arguments available to a
surety, additional defenses are also available through the law and by
the nature of its guarantee. By virtue of the performance bond
arrangement, the surety gains nearly all of the defenses available to a
contractor against an owner; but depending on the controlling
language, most guarantees provide a limitation too.97 These usually
state that a surety’s duty to the owner will not exceed those of the
contractor.98 They continue with a reciprocal statement that limits an
owner’s obligations to a surety to those under the construction
contract.99
One example where a surety asserts the defenses of a principal is
the expiration of a statute of limitations to bring forth a claim. The
Alabama Supreme Court explained that a surety may assert the same
defenses as a principal, which in this case limited claims to two years
against “architects, engineers, and builders.”100 Similarly, the Iowa
Supreme Court disallowed a request for performance by a surety made
five years after dissolution of the business organization named as
principal in the original bond because the statutes required claims
against a dissolved entity within a two year time period.101
In addition, the nature of a construction project makes the
contract between and owner and contractor very fluid. An owner may
make changes to the project, which will modify the contractor’s
96. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F.Supp.2d at 1312.
97. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(C).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Hous. Auth. of City of Huntsville v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 So.2d 577, 582
(Ala. 2006).
101. State of Iowa v. Bi‐states Constr. Co., 269 N.W.2d 455, 456–57 (Iowa 1978).
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agreement; or both parties may mutually decide to adjust the original
contract.102 In these situations, courts traditionally follow a policy of
stricti juris where any change in the original contract released the
surety.103
Modern courts have begun to erode this approach for sureties
receiving compensation for their guarantee.104 The newly adopted
exception for paid sureties in many jurisdictions disallows a discharge
unless the underlying construction contract has a material change as
well as causes some injury, loss, or prejudice.105 As such, the courts
will still discharge a surety when a material change to the original
construction contract occurs.106
In other situations, courts have refused to allow a surety’s defense
to avoid performing due to the lack of prejudice or injury. The first
scenario occurs when a claimant fails to fully comply with the
numerous requirements set forth in the bond or by statute.107 When
courts feel the surety tries to avoid its obligations to perform based on
the failure of the part of the claimant to comply with a technical
necessity, a liberal interpretation applies and requires a showing of
prejudice before allowing the defense.108
Thus, an owner looking to avoid an affirmative defense by a surety
on a project must pay particular attention to the materiality of the
change orders and the performance ability of the contractors as well as
the statute of limitations for filing a claim.
D. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Over time, attitudes towards sureties have changed from friendly
to unsympathetic. This shift in viewpoint occurred in both the
treatment sureties get from the courts and the ability for a claimant to
receive fair dealing in the settlement process.
102. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(C).
103. Winston Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 508 F.2d 1298, 1302 (6th Cir. 1975). The court details
that the rule of stricti juris provided severe and undeserved outcomes for technical breaches in
the underlying contract between the owner and contractor. Id.
104. Id. This court explains that in its instant case applying Georgia law, no authority exists
making the distinction between paid and unpaid surety with relation to applying equitable
principles to achieve more fair outcomes. Id. The court notes that the precedent in Georgia
allows for a surety’s release when the principal and obligee increase its risk without consent but
fails to explain situations where a change does not raise its exposure. Id.
105. See e.g., C. S. Luck & Sons v. Boatwright, 157 Va. 490, 494–95 (1932); City of Montpelier v.
Nat’l Sur. Co., 97 Vt. 111 (1923); Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Clark Cnty. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 92 Kan.
53 (1914); Bross v. McNicholas, 66 Or. 42 (1913).
106. In re Liquidation of Union Indem. Ins. Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (1995).
107. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(G).
108. See Winston Corp., 508 F.2d at 1304; U.S. ex rel. Kelly‐Mohrhusen Co., Inc. v. Merle A.
Patnode Co., 457 F.2d 116, 117–18 (7th Cir. 1972); Am. Bridge Div. of U.S. Steel Corp. v. Brinkley,
255 N.C. 162, 166 (1961).
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1. Judicial Treatment
Once considered a “favorite” of the law, sureties now receive a less
than warm reception from the courts. This prior beneficial treatment
emanated out of the practice in which a private individual decided to
assist a principal in gaining work by eliminating any credit issues
through a guarantee to complete the work in the event he failed to
finish.109 Generally, the person furnishing the guarantee did not
receive compensation or a benefit for assuming the risk; so the law
rewarded the good deed with a “favorite” status.110
As a more commercialized economy evolved, the development of
professional sureties occurred with the change in times.111 As such,
many of the protective rules afforded the uncompensated surety
regularly got revisited with a professional one.112 As discussed earlier,
the split in authority and continued erosion on whether to follow the
policy of stricti juris provides notable examples on the change in
direction.113 The Nebraska Supreme Court illustrated this notion when
it stated, “A builder's bond is construed most strongly against the
surety and in favor of the indemnity which the obligee has reasonable
grounds to expect.”114
Hence, this philosophical shift by the courts now casts doubt on
the common law precedent and may limit the predictability of legal
outcomes for professional sureties moving forward.
2. Surety Bad Faith and Bond Limits
Similar to the abuses of the insurance industry in settling claims,
sureties now face inquiries into their practices. When a surety uses
improper settlement methods, the bad faith claim may get resolved
differently depending on the claimant. When a surety’s conduct does
not meet the standard imposed by the law and the jurisdiction permits
bad‐faith claims, a court may reduce contractual obligations or award
damages that surpass the penal limit on the bond.115 This usually
109. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.03.
110. Id. These commentators point out an example of this favored position comes from the
Statute of Frauds. Id. The English enacted the Statute of Frauds in 1677 and required a writing
for any contract that guarantees the debt of another person. Id. Absent the written document, a
claimant could not hold a surety liable as mentioned in Section II(a). Id. This policy decision was
made to protect a surety from giving an oral promise without due deliberation and to discharge
them when changes between the principal and obligee occurred. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 74 to 79.
114. Sch. Dist. No. 65R of Lincoln Cnty. v. Universal Sur. Co., 178 Neb. 746, 748 (Neb. 1965).
115. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(E), § 32.10(I). In order to achieve a bad
faith claim against a surety, the court must find that a tort occurred that substantiates damages on
both the punitive and normal tort levels. Riva Ridge Apartments v. Roger J. Fisher Co., 745 P.2d
1034, 1037 (Colo. App. 1987). Nervous about obscuring the line between torts and contracts,
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occurs once the obligee declares the principal in default.116 The surety
then finds itself under a duty to investigate the situation and to come
to a swift resolution with all claimants.117
As discussed earlier, a surety usually requires indemnification
from the principal as a condition for providing its guarantee.118
However, when the surety chooses to use various tactics like delay and
self‐serving offers to avoid a settlement, the courts will use bad faith
theories to nullify the indemnification rights or reduce them to the
extent of the losses.119
Other times, the courts will award judgments beyond the penal
limit when it disagrees with a surety’s settlement practices towards an
owner.120 Examples of this type of behavior include a situation where a
surety decided against cooperating in the settlement discussions
concerning an award of prejudgment interest and an instance where
the owner was forced to finish the project with its own funds because
the guarantor threatened lengthy delays for the investigation phase as
well as to complete its obligations to perform.121 As such, several
courts did not hesitate to reign in dubious settlement practices from a
surety trying to avoid its contractual obligations by borrowing the bad
faith remedy used to deter insurance companies.122
Furthermore, the Massachusetts Supreme Court even allowed the
application of the state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act to a surety.123
In this case, the court explained that the Massachusetts “statute
provides a remedy of multiple damages where an insurer ‘forces
plaintiffs to litigate clearly valid claims . . . the surety] in its answer to
the amended complaint, made an ‘insincere response calculated solely
to avoid the inevitable day of reckoning,’ and then extended a
‘monetarily inadequate’ offer.”124
Thus, as the regulatory environment continues to shift with
many courts do not support tort claims of bad faith against sureties. See, e.g., Cates Constr., Inc. v.
Talbot Partners, 21 Cal. 4th 28 (Cal. 1999); Republic Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Saint
Mary’s Cnty., 68 Md. App. 428 (1986); Ins. Co. of the W. v. Gibson Tile Co., 122 Nev. 455 (Nev.
2006); Masterclean, Inc. v. Star Ins. Co., 347 S.C. 405 (S.C. 2001); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. N. Austin
Util., 908 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1995).
116. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(E).
117. Id.
118. See supra Part II (A)(2).
119. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Prince George’s County, 608 A.2d 1301, 1304 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992).
120. See generally U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Serv., Co., 369 F.3d 34 (2nd Cir. 2004);
Cont’l Realty Corp. v. Andrew J. Crevolin Co., 380 F.Supp. 246 (S.D.W.Va. 1974); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
U.S., 951 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
121. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. U.S., 951 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Braspetro Oil Serv., Co., 369 F.3d 34 (2nd Cir. 2004).
122. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(I).
123. R. W. Granger & Sons, Inc. v. J & S Insulation, Inc., 435 N.E.2d. 668, 678 (Mass. 2001).
124. R. W. Granger & Sons, Inc., 435 N.E.2d. at 678.

PRUM_10.5.12 (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2012

10/5/2012 8:45 PM

PERFORMANCE BONDS

19

regard to the differentiation of paid and unpaid sureties and the
investigation and settlement practices begin to resemble those of the
less upstanding members of the insurance industry, the courts will no
longer continue the “favorite” status and will continue to expand many
of the equitable approaches to serve as a deterrent.

III. ISSUES ON A PROJECT
Given the legal parameters in which a performance bond exists,
the different participants and stakeholders in a construction project
must also take into account their respective positions when relying on
such an instrument. To address these risks, this section considers the
additional and unique legal issues attached to a green building project
from both the owner’s and surety’s perspective.
A. FROM AN OWNER’S PERSPECTIVE
Due to the complexities and risks inherent in green construction,
an owner who relies on other participants and form contracts to
ensure a building’s certification by a third party may face many
unanticipated issues when the project falls short of the standard,
which may translate into substantial financial losses.125 However,
when looking to place the responsibility upon other participants, the
owner may find the law and the underlying contracts that were
supposed to protect against these losses unaccommodating to the
recovery of such damages.
1. Validity of Bond
Considering the performance bond, itself, as a source of risk, an
owner faces the possibility that a surety gets released from its
obligations because a court finds grounds to invalidate it or deem it
unenforceable. Evaluating the scenarios where a court invalidates the
performance bond, fraud may occur by the contractor and/or owner.126
When a contractor for a green building project makes a material
misrepresentation on its application for a performance bond, the
surety generally remains obligated to perform its contractual duties.127
Any claim the surety maintains against the contractor’s deceitful
conduct cannot include the owner unless it participated or knew about
125. See Prum & Del Percio 1, supra note 7, at 244.
126. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(B).
127. Id. Of course, the withholding a material fact also creates an issue of nondisclosure in
addition to material misrepresentation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SUR. & GUAR. § 47 (1996). See
Prum & Del Percio 1, supra note 7, at 248.
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the fraudulent misrepresentations.128 In those situations that implicate
the owner, the surety may invalidate the performance bond entirely.129
In green building projects, an owner needs to take this risk seriously;
since the undertaking of constructing such structures includes
inherently sparse experience and/or knowledge by many of the
participants as to the materiality of information during the contracting
process.
In other situations, a surety may pursue legal action to have the
performance bond declared unenforceable.130 These situations occur
when the surety asserts defenses such as mistake131 or impossibility.132
Unilateral133 or mutual134 mistakes made in the agreement by the
owner or contractor regarding the green building project, even if
unintentional, can result in a court finding the underlying construction
contract or performance bond unenforceable.135
Furthermore, a surety may seek a court’s approval to deem the
underlying construction contract impossible or impracticable.136
Proving impracticability requires that one party show: performance
cannot be completed under the contract because of some unexpected
event outside the control of the contractor;137 the contract did not
explicitly make the contractor liable for the risk of the unexpected
event;138 and performing the contract will be much more difficult or
expensive now.139
Finally, a court will not compel the enforcement of the
performance bond where the underlying construction contract
requires a surety to perform illegal work or the purpose runs contrary
to public policy.140 One set of commentators believes that the courts

128. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(B).
129. Id.
130. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(B).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SUR. & GUAR. § 12 (1996).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 36 (1981).
133. See, e.g., Market St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. Wis. 1991) (A
unilateral mistake is a valid defense to contract formation when the non‐mistaken party had
reason to know of the mistake of the other party).
134. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 66 N.W. 568 (Mich. 1887) (Contract rescission is possible in
light of a mutual mistake of a material fact concerning the bargain).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (1981).
136. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(C).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. a (1981). Though an event was
foreseeable or was foreseen in fact, nonoccurrence of the event may still have been a basic
assumption of the contract.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. c (1981). See, e.g., Martin v. Vector Co., 498
F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1974) (A party may, by express agreement, assume a greater obligation).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981). See, e.g., Jennie‐O Foods v. U.S.,
580 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Performance may be impractical from extreme and unreasonable
difficulty; mere increase in difficulty is insufficient).
140. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(B).
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appear more prone to follow this approach when the public policy
becomes stronger against a particular activity.141
In considering the possibility that a surety pursues legal action to
obtain a court order declaring a performance bond or the underlying
construction contract unenforceable, an owner needs to take such risks
seriously. While each theory presents different requirements, a green
building project includes many of the traits that minimize the
opportunities for a surety or contractor to have a court declare a
contract void or unenforceable. For example, current government
policies tend to promote these types of structures and the sustainable
building practices that accompany their construction;142 so a claim for
illegality is unlikely.
Moreover, the participants involved in a green building project
frequently agree to utilize advanced construction techniques that
classify the outcome as a high performance structure.143 As with any
emerging technology, these contractors must evaluate the project for
feasibility before presenting the owner with an offer and agreeing to a
construction contract.
Likewise, a surety maintains the same
opportunities to assess an underlying construction contract for those
issues that could support a finding of impossibility at a later date. As
such, an owner maintains adequate defenses against a contractor or
surety seeking to make a contract unenforceable.
Hence, an owner must take performance bond validity issues
seriously when seeking a guarantee for its contractors in order to
prevent a situation that jeopardizes the stability such a guarantee
provides; but at the same time, it needs to make sure that all
participants have ample opportunity to evaluate and assess the unique
aspects of the green building project to maintain an assumption of risk
defense.
2. Third Party Indemnity Claims Resulting from a Contractor’s Default
When engaging in a green project, an owner generally expects to
Failure to achieve the
achieve green building certification.144
certification goal may generate an unanticipated negative financial

141. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(B).
142. See generally Darren A. Prum et. al., In Third Parties We Trust? The Growing Antitrust
Impact of Third‐Party Green Building Certification Systems for State and Local Governments, J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. (forthcoming Spring 2012) [Hereinafter referred to as Prum, Alberts & Del
Percio].
143. See Darren A. Prum, Roberts J. Aalberts, &Stephen Del Percio, Green Buildings, High
Performance Buildings, and Sustainable Construction: Does it Really Matter What We Call Them?,
21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 25–26 (2010).
144. NAT’L ASS’N OF SUR. BOND PRODUCERS, SUR. AND FID. ASS’N OF AM., PERFORMANCE BONDS ON
GREEN BLDG. CONSTR. (2011) [Hereinafter referred to at NASBP & SFAA].
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impact of substantial proportions.145 Potential damages to the owner
might include: the loss of a tenant or sale; the loss of government
incentives and tax credits; an increase in design and construction
costs; rescinded donations on endowed projects; penalties on projects
with green mandates; increased utilities costs over the life of the
building; and reduced asset value.146
Further clouding the issue, other consequential damages
stemming from a breach of contract pose an added risk that may also
attend a failure to achieve the certification goal.147 Although a mutual
waiver of consequential damages clause is commonly included within
some design and construction contracts, an owner could be placed at
an unacceptable level of risk by agreeing to this term.148
With this in mind, a contractor’s default does not normally allow
an obligee the ability to pursue a surety for third party indemnity
claims, since the performance bond only provides for the completion of
the underlying construction contract at the agreed upon price.149 This
means the paramount risk to a surety will occur where a sustainable
design fails to produce an intended result, or the contractor defaults to
the green construction techniques required in the contract, or for other
unrelated reasons.150 When this happens, the contractor’s issues now
become those of the surety and require resources to satisfy either the
green design or construction techniques included in the underlying
construction contract.151
Because of these additional perils, sureties view green building
projects as more risky than traditional construction undertakings and
have responded accordingly.152 As a result, a contractor’s ability to
obtain a performance bond, or one that does not adversely affect its
bidding price, can impact the mechanism used to provide financial
stability to an owner or the project’s overall cost.
Therefore, an owner must weigh the risk and return relationship
on the various aspects of a green building project to determine the
areas where it requires coverage by a surety and these where it can
accept more exposure to an issue that may later arise.
145. See generally Prum & Del Percio 1, supra note 7.
146. Id.
147. Darren A. Prum & Stephen Del Percio, Green Building Contracts: Considering the Roles of
Consequential Damages & Limitation of Liability Provisions, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 113, 114
(2010) [Hereinafter referred to as Prum & Del Percio 2].
148. Id.
149. See BRITELL, supra note 20, § 10.08. Because of this contractual relationship, an owner can
not normally hold a surety accountable for issues relating to a contractor’s failure to meet the
terms with the green building requirements even though the project may incur the loss of tax
credits, fines, penalties, and other damages. Id.
150. See BRITELL, supra note 20, § 10.08.
151. Id. §§ 10.05[3], 10.08.
152. See generally NASBP & SFAA, supra note 144.
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B. FROM A SURETY’S PERSPECTIVE
As discussed earlier, a surety does not expect to take a loss on a
construction project because it does not consider itself an insurer.153
Nonetheless, many issues outside those normally attributed to a
construction project occur with a green building. As a result, a surety
may find itself in a position where an owner maintains a claim due to
the added exposures created in a green building project.
1. Disputes over Green Designs/Methods
When considering some of the unique aspects associated with a
green building project, a surety needs to take heed to issues that relate
to design and performance. In most construction projects, the owner
provides plans and specifications to the contractor.154 The contractor
must follow those documents precisely in the construction of the
building.155
In United States v. Spearin,156 the court decided: “[I]f the contractor
is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the
owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of
defects in the plans and specifications.”157 This means that design
specifications provide instructions on how to perform the work and
what materials to provide; while performance specifications create
only a standard, leaving the methods of attaining the requirement to
the contractor.
Consequently, the Spearin doctrine applies to design specifications
but does not include performance specifications,158 which provides a
crucial difference to the surety evaluating a green building project. For
instance, if the contractor uses the products specified by the owner and
these products fail to satisfy a third party’s certification requirements,
the contractor bears no responsibility.
By contrast, if the owner establishes a performance specification
that directs the contractor to select materials and building systems
that satisfy a particular third party certification requirement, then the
contractor may choose the appropriate products to meet this objective.
Should the product chosen by the contractor fail to satisfy the third
party certification requirement, the contractor maintains
responsibility for rectifying the issue. As the guarantor of the
underlying construction contract, the surety faces the possibility that
this issue now becomes its own should the owner declare the
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra Part II(A)(1).
See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 19.01.
Id.
United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
Spearin, 248 U.S. at 136.
Id.

PRUM_10.5.12 (DO NOT DELETE)

24

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

10/5/2012 8:45 PM

Vol. 9:1

contractor in default.
Therefore, a surety’s risk increases under the underlying
construction contract when it fails to spell out an owner’s expectations
and specifications, especially when it relates to meeting green building
design and performance requirements.
2. Default for Reasons Unrelated to Green Problems
Outside of the green building issues, a surety maintains other risks
by guaranteeing the underlying construction contract. One issue that
continually persists in the construction setting focuses on the
contractor’s ability to perform. This may emanate from technical
capabilities or even financial resources. As the guarantor of the
contractor’s work, a surety must evaluate the principal’s ability to
perform the underlying construction contract prior to participating in
the performance bond. Should an owner declare default, the surety
might need to supply adequate replacements as one of its options.
On the financial front, a contractor may need payments from the
surety or owner to advance the project.159 As discussed previously, the
contractor may approach the surety to provide financial assistance;160
but this action also comes with the risk that the owner may file a
lawsuit for a torts claim of wrongful interference with a contract.161
On the other hand, a contractor may request that the owner
advance payment for future work.162 In exchange for keeping the
project moving toward completion, an owner may acquiesce to this
request without discharging the surety’s obligations.163 Faced with this
situation, a surety will oppose this action because the disbursement of
contract funds will reduce the remaining balance available for its use
should a declaration of default occur, which increases the project’s
risk.164
However, two courts allowed the owner’s payments to the
contractor provided that the surety’s liability on the performance bond
was reduced by applying the funds towards the project’s
construction.165 These courts seem to allow an owner reasonable
freedom for these types of situations, so that the threat of losing the
protections under the bond does not occur.166
159. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(c).
160. See supra section II(A)(2).
161. See supra section II(B)(3).
162. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(c).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Serv., Co., 369 F.3d 34, 61‐66 (2nd Cir. 2004);
John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Dykeman Electric Co., Inc., 266 F.Supp.2d 208, 238 (D.Mass. 2003).
166. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 F.3d at 61–66; John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc., 266 F.Supp.2d at
239.
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Accordingly, the surety takes on the risk of a contractor default
from both a financial and performance level, meaning it must complete
its due diligence to avoid the potential situation where it suffers a loss.
Therefore, both the green building and traditional construction
projects present potential pitfalls for both the owner and surety and
require that they allocate the corresponding risks and responsibilities
so that all participants recognize their liabilities.

IV. EVALUATION OF CONTRACT AND SURETY LANGUAGE
Given the important role surety contracts play in construction
projects, several different organizations offer their own forms and
language to assist all of the parties involved. By offering a complete set
of form documents, the standard construction contracts provide
universal language that does not tie the documents to the laws of any
particular state, permitting them to be used virtually anywhere. This
allows the parties involved in a construction project to use the form
documents collectively to assemble a cohesive series of contracts. As
such, the form construction contract is written to work cooperatively
with the other agreements so as to minimize gaps, overlaps, and
conflicts between documents on a project.
Depending on the language used in the document, varying degrees
of treatment for a green building project may occur, which have the
potential to create unintended results. With these approaches in mind,
each participant needs to understand the perspective of the drafter in
crafting the performance bond’s language as well as any ramifications
it may cause to the parties should a claim arise at a later date.
Since this article mainly focuses on the type of guarantee an
owner will receive from a surety on a green building project, we will
evaluate the form documents from the AIA, the EJCDC, and
ConsensusDocs that create the relationship as well as the SFAA and
NASBP’s response to green building risk.
A. AIA A312‐2010 AND EJCDC C‐610 (2010) PERFORMANCE BOND
Generally, an analysis of the documents from the AIA and EJCDC
would occur separately, but the most current forms relating to
performance bonds from these two organizations provide identical
language.167 While each of these two organizations independently
167. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, FORM A312‐2010, PERFORMANCE BOND (2010) [hereinafter FORM
A312‐2010]; ENG’RS JOINT CONTRACTS DOCS. COMM. C‐610, PERFORMANCE BOND (2010) [hereinafter
CONTRACT C‐610]. Interestingly, the AIA changes made in 2010 became the first updates to the
language since 1984. See generally SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.01.
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decide on the content of their forms and when to update them, the
decision to use the same language appears to be a desire to shape the
industry standard for such documents due to their size and influence.
Accordingly, examining the applicable provisions will require
evaluating both organizations’ forms together.
These two organizations contain sixteen independent sections
that make up performance bond forms, with the last section allowing
the parties to include any modifications they desire to incorporate into
the document.168 The first section follows the Restatement (Third) of
Torts by creating a joint and several liability situation where the
contractor and surety owe a dual duty towards the project’s owner.169
This section’s language makes the surety’s obligation the same as the
contractor while also providing both parties the same defenses in the
event an owner makes a claim.170
In Section 2 of the Restatement, the language clarifies when the
surety’s responsibility begins.171
The section uses conditional
terminology to terminate the surety’s obligations from performance
“[i]f the Contractor performs the Construction Contract.”172 However,
it leaves open an exception for situations where the owner needs to
hold a conference to declare default.173
While this language places a heavy emphasis on the contractor’s
performance of the Construction Contract, it also creates a huge
ambiguity that will undoubtedly require a determination at a later time
should a dispute occur. This dispute will most likely focus on the level
of performance by the contractor based upon the underlying
construction agreement. Depending on the particular factual scenario,
a court may need to evaluate whether the contractor “perform[ed] the
Construction Contract.”
Should the obligee need to initiate the surety’s obligations under
the contract, Section 3 provides the requirements on how to compel
performance.174 The language specifically calls for the obligee to begin
the action by holding a conference with the surety and the owner to
discuss the contractor’s performance.175 This particular language
168. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167.
169. Compare FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 1, and CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 1,
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SUR. & GUAR. § 39 cmt. 1 (1996).
170. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 1; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 1. Section 1 in
both documents states, “The Contractor and Surety, jointly and severally, bind themselves, their
heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns to the Owner for the performance of the
Construction Contract, which is incorporated herein by reference.” FORM A312‐2010, supra;
CONTRACT C‐610, supra.
171. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 2; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 3; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 3.
175. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 3.1; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 3.1.
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reduces the obligee’s leverage over the surety because it disallows the
declaration of a default for minor deficiencies as well as requires a
conference when the consideration of such an action occurs.176
Furthermore, this provision allows all of the parties the ability to
mutually approve additional time for the contractor to perform its
duties without harming the obligee’s rights.177
However, when reading the provisions of section 3.1 along with
Section 4 of the document, an obligee’s inability to hold a conference
will “not constitute a failure to comply with a condition precedent to
the Surety’s obligations, or release the Surety from its obligations,
except to the extent the Surety demonstrates actual prejudice.”178 By
including this additional language, the conference ultimately becomes
optional because a surety cannot assert the lack of one as a defense to
performance. This makes the conference an effective tool where it will
aid in gaining performance from a contractor but will not create an
obstacle to declaring default when time is of the essence.
Should a contractor fail to resolve any material issues with the
project, then the obligee needs to declare the contractor in default,
terminate the agreement for construction services, and notify the
surety of these actions in order to proceed further under Section 3.2.179
The insertion of these requirements creates the previously discussed
defining act whereby the obligee takes the affirmative step that
delineates a problematic project from one that obligates a surety under
the bonding instrument.180 Likewise, the obligee must then disburse
the unpaid portion of the agreement for construction services to the
surety or its designee.181 As such, this creates a situation where the
obligee voluntarily cedes control of the performance aspects of the
project to the surety.182
Once an obligee declares default, Section 5 allows the surety to
take one of four courses of action in order to satisfy its obligations.183
176. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 3.1; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 3.1.
177. Id.
178. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 3.1, 4; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 3.1, 4.
179. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 3.2; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 3.2. The
insertion of this language appears as a response to the requirement articulated by the L & A
Contracting Co. case discussed earlier. See supra Part II(B)(3).
180. See supra Part II(b)(iii); SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(D).
181. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 3.3; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 3.3; See supra
Part II(B)(3).
182. See supra Part II(B)(3).
183. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 5; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 5. One
difference between the private sector and federal government occurs in this area. Compare FORM
A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 5, and CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 5, with 48 CFR § 49.404
(2012). While the AIA and EJCDC allow the surety to make the decision on how to proceed, the
federal government retains these rights under bond’s issued pursuant to its projects. 48 CFR §
49.404 (2012).
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The surety may:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Arrange for the original contractor to complete the contract,
so long as the obligee agrees;184
Complete the project itself by hiring its own contractors;185
Obtain bids or negotiated proposals from qualified
contractors that the obligee deems acceptable as well as
arrange for their performance while providing new
performance and payment bonds;186 or
Waive its right to perform or complete the project by either
paying the obligee its costs for completion after an
investigation, or deny liability in whole or in part with
written justifications for the decision.187

Furthermore, and as previously discussed,188 the surety also
maintains the option to repurchase the bond by paying the contract
balance or the appropriate prorated amount from the obligee.
While the appropriate course of action may take time to decide, a
surety must act relatively quickly under Section 6 of the form.189 Upon
receipt of written notice from the obligee to perform, the surety must
select a direction with “reasonable promptness” that does not exceed
seven days.190 After that time, the obligee may automatically deem the
surety in default of its obligations and pursue legal remedies.191 The
form provides that any proceeding under the performance bond be
initiated in court upon the earlier of two years from (1) the
contractor’s default, (2) the contractor’s cessation of work, or (3) the
surety’s refusal or failure to perform its obligations under the
performance bond.192 Moreover and in conjunction with Section 7, the
form also memorializes the previously discussed principle that an
obligee may not demand a higher level of performance from the surety
than expected from the contractor.193
With these provisions in mind, the AIA and EJCDC forms do not
appear to distinguish between standard construction practices and
those associated with a green building.194 The language of the
184. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 5.1; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 5.1.
185. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 5.2; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 5.2.
186. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 5.3; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 5.3.
187. A FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 5.4; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 5.4.
188. See supra Part II(A)(2).
189. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 6; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 6.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. FORM A312‐2010, supra note 167, § 9; CONTRACT C‐610, supra note 167, § 9.
193. See supra Part II(A)(2).
194. Of course this could change if the parties decide to take advantage of section sixteen’s
open ended provision that allows the bond’s parties to create exclusions such as the one proposed
by the SFAA and NASBP, which is part of a discussion in section IV(e) AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS,
FORM A312‐2010, PERFORMANCE BOND § 16 (2010); ENG’RS JOINT CONTRACTS DOCS. COMM. C‐610,
PERFORMANCE BOND § 16 (2010).
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performance bond simply defers to the underlying construction
contract and the provisions contained within that agreement for the
treatment of any additional risks associated with a given project.195
The underlying AIA and EJCDC contracts and the referenced general
condition documents mainly address damages.196 The language simply
focuses on how to treat the damages, which would apply in those
situations where the green building failed to gain certification.197
Furthermore, neither set of forms provides specific language or a
supplemental document to address the issues associated with
sustainable construction; so this untested application leaves open to
interpretation whether the underlying AIA and EJCDC forms will
compel a surety on a green building project to obtain a specific third
party certification. However, the organizations did craft their forms to
require a surety to complete the project within the original price and
terms of the underlying construction contract. Should the project
include a third party certification as one of its criteria for completion
and an owner can show that this was communicated to the contractor,
then a surety would most likely have an obligation to meet this
requirement just like any other benchmark.
Thus, the AIA and EJCDC performance bond form appears to
provide a flexible set of documents that could require a surety to
obtain a third party certification on a green building should the
project’s owner take the appropriate steps to ensure that the
contractor was notified, expected, and required to meet such a
standard.
B. CONSENSUS DOCS FORM 260 – PERFORMANCE BOND
To provide an alternative to the AIA and EJCDC, a consortium of
owners, contractors, and trade groups introduced a series of standard
form construction documents called ConsensusDOCS in 2007.198 This
195. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, FORM A312‐2010, PERFORMANCE BOND (2010); ENG’RS JOINT
CONTRACTS DOCS. COMM. C‐610, PERFORMANCE BOND (2010).
196. See Prum & Del Percio 2, supra note 147, at 125–30.
197. Id.
198. Larry D. Harris, Brian M. Perlberg, Advantages of the ConsensusDocs Construction
Contracts, 29 CONSTR. LAWYER 1 (Winter 2009). ConsensusDOCS are the first industry‐wide
(collaborative) set of form construction documents presented as an alternative to the AIA and
EJCDC contract series of the time. Id. The ConsensusDOCS, released by the Associated General
Contractors of America in September 2007, represent over three years of work by twenty‐three
leading industry associations, including, without limitation, associations of architects, owners,
contractors and sureties. Id. Surety industry participants included the National Association of
Surety Bond Producers (“NASBP”) and the Surety & Fidelity Association of America (“SFAA”).
Other industry participants included the following: Associated General Contractors of America
(“AGC”); Construction Owners Association of America (“COAA”); The Construction Users
Roundtable (“CURT”); Associated Specialty Contractors, Inc. (“ASC”); Construction Industry
Round Table (“CIRT”); American Subcontractors Association, Inc. (“ASA”); Associated Builders
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new option in standard form construction documents is different in
substantive ways from the offerings of other organizations like the AIA
and EJCDC; so they provide a real alternative choice in contract
With this in mind, the ConsensusDOCS Form 260
terms.199
Performance Bond supplies another option to the participants on a
construction project.200
Taking a more minimalist approach, the ConsensusDOCS form
contains only three independent provisions in the agreement: General
Conditions, Surety Obligations, and Dispute Resolution.201 Departing
from the Restatement (Third) of Torts guidance to create a joint and
several liability situation where the surety and contractor owe a duty
to the obligee,202 Section 1 simply establishes a conditional relationship
amongst the parties without an attribution of liability between the
surety and contractor.203 The language removes the surety’s duty to
act when the contractor completes the underlying construction
agreement.204 Until such time when complete satisfaction with the
underlying construction contract occurs, the surety’s commitment will
continue.205
While the absence of the “jointly and severally liable” language
strongly reduces the risk associated with issuing a performance bond
for a surety, it severely limits an obligee’s ability to recoup damages.
This language allows an obligee to legally pursue both the contractor
and the surety equally when a default occurs on the underlying
construction contract.206 Under the ConsensusDOCS language, an
obligee may lose the option of pursuing both the contractor and surety
for the default of the underlying construction contract, which means an
owner might incur unrecoverable damages.207
and Contractors (“ABC”); National Association of State Facilities Administrator (“NASFA”); Lean
Construction Institute (“LCI”); Finishing Contractors Association (“FCA”); Mechanical Contractors
Association of America (“MCAA”); National Electrical Contractors Association (“NECA”); National
Insulation Association (“NIA”); National Roofing Contractors Association (“NRA”); Painting and
Decorating Contractors of America (“PDA”); Plumbing Heating Cooling Contractors Association
(“PCC”); National Subcontractors Alliance (“NA”); Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’
National Association (“SMANA”); and Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (“AWI”). Id.
199. See generally id.
200. CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 260, PERFORMANCE BOND (2009).
201. Id.
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SUR. & GUAR. § 39, cmt. 1 (1996).
203. CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 260, PERFORMANCE BOND § 1 (2009).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: EFFECT OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY § 10 (2012).
207. This situation would occur in the highly probable circumstance where the contractor
declares bankruptcy and the surety steps in to finish the underlying construction contract. See
SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(F). An owner would receive the completed building
from the surety but would have no ability to redress any damages suffered because of the
problems caused by the original contractor. Id.
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Turning to a contractor default situation, the form also prohibits
the obligee from calling upon the surety until it has satisfied its duties
contained in the underlying construction contract.208 By using this
language, the form indirectly incorporates the applicable provisions
for claims and damages found in the underlying construction
contract.209
While waiving the right for notice with regard to alterations or
extensions of time, the form also requires an obligee to “make the
Contract Balance available to the Surety for completion of the Work”
when declaring a default situation.210 This language requires the
obligee to make payments as directed by the surety, but it does not
compel an immediate tender of the remaining balance for the
underlying construction contract.211
By taking this approach, the obligee remains in control of the
project’s finances instead of the surety. An obligee would not need to
take early draws on the construction loan or secure immediate
financing to complete the project in order to immediately pay the
surety. However, the surety assumes the same risk as the contractor
with respect to receiving payments from the owner; since the obligee
need not provide the remainder of the unpaid balance of the
underlying construction contract when declaring default. This would
probably mean an obligee could continue to withhold retainage and
performance related payments as allowed under the primary
construction contract until the project completes a final financial
closeout.
When the surety’s performance becomes necessary, the form
requires the obligee to declare the contractor in default pursuant to the
underlying construction contract.212 At that time, the surety must take
action without delay by either choosing to complete the remaining
obligations contained in the underlying construction contract or by
purchasing the remaining value of the performance bond from the
obligee.213
Should the surety choose to complete the remaining obligations
contained in the underlying construction contract, it may either use the
existing contractors and subcontractors on the project or select
suitable replacements.214 No matter the choice, the form language
208. See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11.
209. See generally id. As noted earlier, the form provides an in depth review of the damages
clause(s) associated with the ConsensusDOCS underlying construction contract form. Prum & Del
Percio 2, supra note 147.
210. SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(F).
211. Id.
212. Id. § 2.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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reserves the right for the obligee to provide consent to anyone the
surety decides to hire in order to complete its obligations.215
Alternatively, the bond language also allows the surety to surrender its
right to complete the underlying construction contract by
compensating the obligee “the amount of its reasonable costs, not to
exceed the Bond Sum, to complete the Work less the Contract
Balance.”216 Disputes with the surety under the performance bond, can
be initiated in any court of competent jurisdiction in the location in
which the project is located within two years from default of the
contractor or substantial completion of the work, whichever is
earlier.217
Considering these provisions, the ConsensusDOCS form fails to
differentiate between standard construction practices and those
related to building green; however, the Green Building Addendum we
discuss in the next section of this article addresses those issues for this
organization’s suite of documents.218 Since the ConsensusDOCS’
approach includes only three sections of language in its performance
bond form, many parts of the document yield to the primary
construction contract.
In looking at the applicable portions of the underlying
construction contract without the use of the Green Building
Addendum, the form lacks particular language that tackles the issues
linked to sustainable construction. Accordingly, it is unresolved
whether the ConsensusDOCS performance bond and underlying
construction contract, absent the additional form, will require a surety
on a green building project to obtain a specific third party certification.
The language employed in the performance bond requires the surety
to finish the construction project as per the original price and terms of
the underlying agreement.219 If the project included a third party green
building certification as part of its specifications for completion and
the owner can demonstrate that the requirement was conveyed to the
contractor, it follows that a surety would probably have a duty to
attain this obligation with the same commitment as any other
provision.
Hence, the ConsensusDOCS performance bond form seems to offer
an alternative to the AIA and EJCDC documents where a surety could
be forced to deliver a third party certification for a green building if the
project owner incorporates that requirement into the underlying
construction contract absent the inclusion of the Green Building
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See SWEET AND SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.10(F).
Id. § 2(C).
CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 260, PERFORMANCE BOND § 3 (2009).
See infra section IV(d).
See CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 200, GENERAL CONTRACTING (2007).
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Addendum but must also be wary that a limitation occurs with
pursuing damages against the bond’s guarantor should the contractor
be in a position that it cannot pay them.
C. OPTIONAL GREEN BUILDING ADDENDUM
Further augmenting the ConsensusDOCS suite of forms, the Green
Building Addendum serves as a supplement to the primary design or
construction agreement with rating system neutral language.220 This
document recognizes the roles and responsibilities for project
participants that assist in attaining the owner’s green building goals in
addition to assigning risk for the project.221
In its capacity to assign roles and responsibilities, the document
requires the participants to make a distinction between procedural
and physical “green measures” that the participants anticipate
accomplishing during the project in order to comply with the green
building objectives identified by the owner in another part of the
form.222 Section 6 identifies both the procedural and physical “green
measures” needed to accomplish the project’s goals as well as potential
design and construction alternatives.223
To assign responsibility, the owner must designate a “Green
Building Facilitator” (“GBF”) to manage and assist the process of
complying with the owner’s desired green building goals.224 The form
specifically allows for the selection of an architect/engineer,
contractor, or other corporate entity (or individual) as the GBF.225
As for addressing risk, the Addendum contains an entire section
dedicated to this subject.226 Section 8.2 restricts the liability of the
participants in the project to those limitations found in the primary
agreement and stipulates that an:
Owner's loss of income or profit or inability to realize potential
reductions in operating, maintenance or other related costs, tax or
other similar benefits or credits, marketing opportunities and other
similar opportunities or benefits, resulting from a failure to attain
220. CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 310, GREEN BUILDING ADDENDUM (2009). This document should work
in conjunction with the other forms and was not designed as a stand‐alone agreement. Id. The
Addendum allows a project to seek certification under any of the various third party certification
systems (i.e., LEED, Green Globes, NAHB‐ICC 700, etc.) because the form uses rating system
neutral objectives. Id. § 3.
221. Id. §§ 3, 8 (2009).
222. Id. § 6. An owner defines the goals for the Addendum in §3.1 where the project elect to be
either “an Elected Green Status” or “benefits to the environment or natural resources, either as
part of the construction process or during the life cycle, use or maintenance of the Project.” Id. §
3.1.
223. Id.
224. Id. § 4.1
225. Id.
226. Id. § 8.
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the Elected Green Status or intended benefits to the environment,
shall be deemed consequential damages subject to any applicable
waiver of consequential damages227

in any primary design or construction contract.
Furthermore, this section also addresses the liability for the
GBF.228 Within Section 8.3, the form contains detailed language to
release all project participants other than the GBF from being “liable or
responsible for the failure of the Elected Green Measures to achieve the
Elected Green Status or intended benefits to the environment or
natural resources”; yet it also expressly provides that this language
“does not relieve any Project Participant from any obligation to
perform or provide Elected Green Measures as required by its
Governing Contract.”229
In essence, the Addendum, in conjunction with the primary
construction contract, addresses several potential risk concerns for a
surety when asked to guarantee a green building construction
situation. First, it places the liability associated with attaining a third
party certification standard upon the GBF.230 With this assignment of
liability distinctly identified, a surety will have the means to assess risk
on the construction project while evaluating and distinguish the
principal’s ability to perform the underlying contract and its green
building obligations.231
Additionally, section 8.2 recognizes many of the areas a surety
would identify as risky and classifies them as consequential
damages.232 While this document is silent on the definition and
distribution of consequential damages, the fact that the Addendum
serves as a supplement to the primary design or construction contract,
which leaves its interpretation reliant upon the other agreement.233
Depending on the language contained in the primary design or
construction contract, the treatment of consequential damages will
vary greatly.234 Should the parties use ConsensusDOCS’ General
Contracting documents and choose not to alter the applicable
provisions,235 the clause will create an absolute and mutual surrender

227. CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 310, GREEN BUILDING ADDENDUM §8.2 (2009).
228. Id. § 8.2.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See NASBP & SFAA, supra note 144.
232. CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 310, GREEN BUILDING ADDENDUM § 8.2 (2009).
233. See generally id.
234. See Prum & Del Percio 2, supra note 147. The referenced article provides a more in depth
discussion on consequential damage and limitation of liability language used by the AIA, EJCDC,
and ConsensusDOCS. Each organization maintains its own nuances and approaches to dealing
with this issue.
235. CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 200, GENERAL CONTRACTING §6.5 (2007).
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of the consequential damages claims.236 From a surety’s point of view,
this combination will greatly reduce or eliminate the additional risk
associated with a green building project.237
Accordingly, the Green Building Addendum supplied by
ConsensusDOCS offers mixed results that depend on the language used
in the primary construction contract. As a surety, the possibility of an
unexpected claim on a green building project gets reduced partially by
placing the liability for attaining a third party certification directly on
the GBF and then the Green Building Addendum sets up another layer
of risk for reduction by identifying and treating certain situations as
consequential damages. This approach ensures that the surety only
guarantees the building and not the requirements to meet a certain
standard.
In contrast, the owner receives no assurance the project will
attain a green building standard other than from the GBF, which may
not have as many financial resources as the contractor or surety. In
addition, the owner also allows many situations where an injury could
occur due to the building failing to attain its green building standard to
receive treatment as consequential damages. This leaves the primary
construction contract as the last line of defense to recoup any of the
possible losses should events turn bad and only receive a guarantee for
a building from the surety’s performance bond.
Thus, the Green Building Addendum in conjunction with the
primary construction contract appears to strongly favor the surety to
guarantee delivery of a structure to the detriment of the owner seeking
to receive a green building.
D. SFAA AND NASBP GREEN BUILDING APPROACHES TO RISK
In reaction to the Washington, D.C., legislation and the possible
situation where a surety becomes the compliance mechanism for an
environmentally friendly government policy elsewhere, the SFAA and
NASBP responded to these developments by jointly evaluating the
permanency and growth of the green building practices as well as
identifying the additional risks associated with providing a financial
guarantee under such circumstances, while they put forward their own
proposals for managing the perils related to those projects.238 Based
on their evaluation, the two organizations advanced the two
alternatives of either inserting exclusionary language into the
performance bond or for the surety to take a risk management
approach.239
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Prum & Del Percio 2, supra note 147 at 131.
See NASBP & SFAA, supra note 144.
See NASBP & SFAA, supra note 144, at 1–4.
Id. at 3–4.
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Following a more conservative approach, the SFAA and NASBP
offer exclusionary language for those sureties that seek to avoid
writing a performance bond that excludes the risk linked to a green
building and limit its liability only to the contractor’s construction
obligations.240 As such, the two organizations offer the following
language for insertion into a performance bond:
NO LIABILITY FOR GREEN BUILDING REQUIREMENTS. The
condition of the Bond does not include any obligation to achieve any
green building certification, status, level of performance, water
usage or energy usage, whether mandated by statute, ordinance or
otherwise. The Principal and Surety shall not be liable under the
Bond for any damages or costs caused or allegedly caused by, arising
out of, or related to the project’s failure to achieve such certification,
status, level of performance, water usage or energy usage, including,
but not limited to, attorneys’ fees, unrealized cost savings, lost
profits, lost tax credits, or other costs, expenses, fees, or benefits.241

In contrast, the SFAA and NASBP also recognize an alternative
approach for those sureties wishing to participate in green building
projects.242 They suggest a surety take a more active role of identifying
the green building risks by assigning responsibility and managing
those aspects of a project that pose an issue.243 A surety could look to
some of the various form documents written to facilitate and provide
responsibility with green building construction while trying to manage
other exposures through contractual waivers of consequential
damages.244 Ultimately, the surety must assess the green building
plans, those parties involved in the project, and determine its risk
tolerance before proceeding.245
In trying to reconcile these issues, the SFAA and NASBP put
forward their own proposals for managing and/or eliminating the
risks associated with green building construction for a surety while
recognizing the fundamental aspects of these projects provide viable
business opportunities.
Consequently, the underlying construction contracts for the AIA,
EJCDC, and ConsensusDOCS provide the guidance as to whether the
respective performance bonds will require a surety to deliver a green
building with a third party certification; but other documents like the
Green Building Addendum and language supported by the SFAA and
NASBP can change the outcome to require only the structure.
240. See NASBP & SFAA, supra note 144, at 3–4.
241. Id. at 3.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. Specifically, the SFAA and NASBP mention ConsensusDOCS’ Green Building
Addendum as a form that will accomplish their stated goals of reducing, eliminating, and
managing the risks associated with a green building construction project. Id.
245. Id.
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V. PROPOSAL FOR BETTER RESULTS
To an owner endeavoring to complete a green building, the
inherent risk in failing to complete the project creates the need for
mechanisms that provide stability like a performance bond.246 The
performance bond attempts to assuage an owner’s overall concerns
related to delivery and cost by transferring some of the project’s risk to
a surety.247 In reality, the owner can only shift so much risk as the
surety will accept; an agreement represents a compromise as to what
level of transfer is deemed acceptable.
In considering the performance bond coverage, the main issue
surrounding green buildings appears to focus on whether the owner
maintains a single objective in constructing a green building or seeks
two separate objectives. The legislation in Washington, D.C.248 coupled
with the Shaw Development249 lawsuit sparked this debate. The Shaw
Development case appears to further the notion that an owner
contracts for a “green building”250; while the Washington, D.C.
legislation created two separate bond instruments for construction
projects with sustainability components.251
With this in mind, this section will address the main issues
associated with finding a common middle ground where an owner and
surety can both feel comfortable that the performance bond will
provide appropriate coverage without undue risk.
A. ISSUES FROM AN OWNER’S PERSPECTIVE
As the party initiating the project, an owner looks to a
performance bond as protection against contractor default.252 In
utilizing such an instrument, the owner maintains many objectives that
need attention within the performance bond and the underlying
construction contract. These include making sure all parties involved
in the contract understand the project’s objectives and complete the
proper due diligence on those performing the work and supplying the
246. See SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.04; Barru, supra note 11, at 53.
247. See SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 11, § 32.04; Barru, supra note 11, at 52. While we
explain that a performance bond provides for the transfer of risk, one commentator explains that
these instruments do not qualify under a purist point of view because of the indemnity
requirements. 4A BRUNER & O’CONNER, CONSTR. LAW § 7:18 (2012). Our earlier discussion on the
subject matter recognizes this unique aspect but also explains that a surety may take a loss in
those situations where the contractor declares bankruptcy. See supra Part II(a)(i).
248. Washington, D.C., Green Building Act of 2006, D.C. CODE tit. 6, § 6‐1451.05 (West 2008).
249. See Shaw Dev., LLC v. S. Builders, Inc., No.: 19‐C‐07‐011405, Circuit Court, Somerset Co.,
Md. (2008).
250. Id.
251. See Washington, D.C., Green Building Act of 2006, D.C. CODE tit. 6, § 6‐1451.05.
252. BRUNER & O’CONNER, supra note 247, § 12:14.

PRUM_10.5.12 (DO NOT DELETE)

38

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

10/5/2012 8:45 PM

Vol. 9:1

materials. To this end, we address these issues from the owner’s
perspective.
1. Alignment of the Project Goals with the Coverage
A prudent owner understands that the principal contract is the
primary means for dictating a contractor’s obligations for a green
building project. Owners can be expected to demand a guarantee for
obtaining certification from third party organizations. That request
can conflict with the architect and contractor’s needs to manage their
own risks given that many factors impacting certification credits are
not within their sole control.
Nondisclosures, mistakes and
impossibilities related to the contract can also result in its
unenforceability and possibly the voiding of the surety bond.
To remedy this issue, the contract documents should begin by
explicitly allocating green building certification responsibilities to the
appropriate party. As seen in the resulting lawsuit from the Shaw
Development case,253 the contract document forms lacked specificity
and clarity, which meant that the contractor was only responsible for
building according to the plans and specifications. This led to a lawsuit
when the contractor did not deliver a green building and the owner
lost the corresponding tax credits.254 While the case settled out of
court, the mere fact that a lawsuit occurred illustrates why a wise
owner will clearly describe a contractor’s obligations with respect to
the construction of a green building project.255
In concert with this idea, the ConsensusDOCS Green Building
Addendum solves many of these issues but provides marginal relief.
The ConsensusDOCS document assigns responsibility to someone to
manage and assist in the process of fulfilling the owner’s green
building goals256 but does not take into account the practical aspect
that many of the green building consultants do not maintain
professional liability insurance coverage for their projects. For those
that purchase insurance, they usually pay their defense and other costs
because of their high deductible policies. This presents the likely
scenario where an owner maintains a credible cause of action but can
recover very little from a defendant that has the capability of becoming
judgment proof while the other participants in the project assert a lack
of culpability based on the construction contract’s language.
At a minimum, specific contractual terms should address
253. See Shaw Dev., LLC v. S. Builders, Inc., No.: 19‐C‐07‐011405, Circuit Court, Somerset Co.,
Md. (2008).
254. Id.
255. See Prum & Del Percio 1, supra note 7, at 246–47; Prum & Del Percio 2, supra note 147, at
143–44.
256. CONSENSUSDOCS, FORM 310, GREEN BUILDING ADDENDUM (2009).
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responsibility for registering the project, compiling and maintaining
documentation to obtain the program specific credits, applying for
certification, responding to the certifying organization’s requests for
additional information or clarification, and prosecuting the appeal
process in the event that the initial request for certification is
denied.257 One simple approach for an owner to maintain leverage
would be to adjust the terms of retainage to coincide with the issuance
of a third party’s green building certification. This should leave an
owner with adequate funds to pay for any remedial actions in the
physical construction of the building to obtain a third party
certification; but it would not alleviate any flaws that emanate from the
designers.
In terms of assigning liability, it should include all participants in
the project, so that an owner avoids the predicament of receiving a
noncompliant building but those responsible can use a defense
mechanism that makes them judgment proof. A provision that makes
all participants “jointly and severally liable” would solve this issue, but
may not offer a practical solution because some participants affect the
certification outcome more than others. A common middle ground
could include a statement that holds all participants liable and uses a
comparative negligence type of standard. This would allow for
apportionment from those participants in the project based on
respective degrees of contribution while yielding a consequence on
everyone involved should they not fulfill their obligations of delivering
a green building to the owner.
For an owner who views a project singularly, the underlying
construction contract should incorporate the green building
requirements and aspects into the project in such a manner where it
becomes inextricably intertwined with the traditional characteristics
while making each participant culpable for the overall outcome.
2. Due Diligence on the Contractor and Its Resources
As mentioned earlier, an issue that may arise in a green building
project relates to a contractor’s lack of financial resources. Mitigating
the risk that a contractor cannot financially afford to complete the
project requires performance of due diligence by the owner and, as
discussed later, the surety. Due to issues such as growing too fast, or
having too many simultaneous projects, variable or unpredictable cash
flow, or failure to adequately plan around a budget or to control costs,

257. Ronald S. Cusano, Speech, When “Green” Turns to “Red” and LEEDs to a Summons and
Complaint: Potential Liability on Green Projects, 2009 FORUM ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (copy
of presentation paper on file with the American Bar Association Forum on the Construction
Industry).
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a contractor may pose a financial risk to the entire green building
project.
Financial due diligence by owners should include an assessment
of the contractor’s backlog growth relative to balance sheet, its history
of stable job revenues and profits, disciplined approach to project
selection and a matching of resources and expertise with opportunities
in order to evaluate whether the contractor’s commitment to current,
future and prior projects reveals reasonable growth without over‐
committing itself.
Cash flow is another important financial
consideration. Rapid backlog growth can place a strain on cash flow as
can project start‐up costs and financing retainage. Owners and
sureties should look for cash flow positive projects in the contractor’s
portfolio along with strong billing and collection practices, cash
reserves to handle unexpected expenses and minimal bank use and/or
availability of an adequate bank line of credit.
Additional due diligence into the quality of the contractor includes
an evaluation of the business plan and company pro formas, with
detailed projections for earnings, balance sheet and cash flow. The
contractor should have the ability to (and a history of) consistently
meet or exceed projections, with appropriate cost controls, project cost
accounting system and the ability to capture cost information “from
the field” in real time.
Thus, a prudent owner looking to minimize its issues with
constructing a green building needs to evaluate each contractor and its
resources to find the best fit in all aspects so that it avoids declaring
default and dealing with a surety to complete the project.
B. ISSUES FROM A SURETY’S PERSPECTIVE
When evaluating a surety’s duties owed an obligee of a
performance bond, the requirements will depend on the underlying
construction contract. Generally, a surety’s duties to an obligee will
remain the same as a typical construction project when the effort
includes green scopes of work and contract provisions.258 When a
contractor agrees to accomplish specific outcomes or build innovated
designs associated with sustainability, the surety’s risk becomes
proportionately greater than in traditional construction.259
To alleviate many of the risks in a performance bond guaranteeing
a green building construction contract, a surety needs to complete its
due diligence because of the perceived exposures associated with such
projects.260 The surety must take into account the project’s design, the

258. See BRITELL, supra note 20, § 10.08.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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underlying construction contract requirements, and the contractor’s
experience with constructing and delivering a green building.261 Upon
reviewing these aspects of the project, the surety may decide to
proceed or require exclusions in the performance bond.262
1. Underlying Construction Contract Due Diligence
It is critical on a green project for contracts to clearly specify, and
for sureties to clearly understand, whether the contractor’s duties are
driven by design specifications or performance specifications. A likely
scenario occurs when the contractor receives a detailed set of plans
and specifications to follow, but the documents also require the
contractor to accept responsibility for achieving a certain level of
certification from a third party organization. This constitutes a mixing
of design and performance specifications. Without clear language in
the contract, a contractor may unwittingly accept responsibility for the
design of the project and any resulting failure to achieve the third
party organization’s certification. To the extent practicable, the surety
should require performance specifications to include design
specifications so as to achieve a level of clarity in the contract that
places the responsibility for specificity on the owner.
The surety should also be wary of a contractor guaranteeing a
specific type of certification.263 A contractor should generally not
guarantee any outcome over which the contractor does not have
control. Specifically, many third party certification credits are design
credits, and the contractor typically has little to no control over design.
Understandably, many owners will want to spread or shift the risk for
third party certification to the contractor, at least to some degree. It is
optimal from a risk management standpoint to avoid guarantees, but
such avoidance is also infeasible. A precise contract can well define the
guarantee and thereby mitigate the surety’s risk.264
2. Contract Performance Due Diligence
Aside from a surety guaranteeing an underlying construction
contract that puts it at risk to deliver a third party certification, the
default of the principal or contractor with green building requirements

261. See BRITELL, supra note 20, § 10.08.
262. Id.
263. While the merits of this type of claim are debatable, a lawsuit may occur whereby the
contractor or surety becomes liable to an owner under a Uniform Commercial Code Warranty
Theory. See Prum & Del Percio 1, supra note 7, at 251.
264. U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, THE LEGAL RISK IN “BUILDING GREEN”: NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES? A
USGBC PANEL DISCUSSION 5, available at http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/
AttorneyPubs/White%20Paper_DBlake.pdf.
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poses issues as well.265 A surety needs to evaluate the tasks assigned in
the underlying construction contract to determine the principal’s
abilities to perform and whether any suitable replacements exist
should a declaration of default occur.266
In a given green building project, the contractor may contribute
special sustainability expertise or maintain responsibility for supplying
hard to find green materials or fabrications.267 Should the obligee
declare this contractor in default, a surety’s endeavor to find a suitable
replacement may turn very problematical and expensive.268 In light of
this issue, one commentator points out the need for a surety to
complete its due diligence with respect to the contractor’s obligations
on the underlying construction contract and reach a point of
satisfaction that the work will be completed without a problem or that
suitable replacements exist.269
Therefore, a surety that wishes to provide its services must
complete its due diligence while evaluating the risks associated with
the project’s design, the underlying construction contract
requirements, and the contractor’s experience with constructing and
delivering a green building so that the likelihood of an owner declaring
default is minimized and an unexpected performance surprise does not
occur.
C. A BALANCED PROPOSAL
Given these unique perspectives on a green building project, a
middle ground appears within reach. It appears as if two main issues
dominate the participants in a green building project with respect to a
performance bond and the proper level of coverage. The first issue
focuses on whether the surety guarantees delivery of a green building
based on the underlying construction contract. Second, the surety
needs to determine whether to exclude some of the principal’s
activities from its performance bond guarantee.
In seeking a middle ground to the first issue, the ConsensusDOCS
Green Building Addendum provides a good approach by centralizing
responsibility on a GBF to coordinate the green building activities.
This will help ensure compliance throughout the whole process and
give the project the best chance to attain the owner’s green building
objectives. However, it appears misguided to place all of the liability
on the GBF,270 since all project participants have a hand in
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See BRITELL, supra note 20, § 10.05[3].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Beyond choosing a scapegoat, this approach runs counter to the guiding principles
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accomplishing the owner’s green building objectives and the
judgment‐ proof defendant looms large.
We suggest that the underlying construction contract and
accompanying documentation utilize a comparative negligence
approach by apportioning liability amongst the participants to ensure
that an owner receives the expected third party certification. This way
each party maintains a stake in meeting the owner’s green building
objectives and not one party gets singled out for the entire liability.
Even an owner could participate by waiving its right to a portion of its
claims should the project transform during construction due to an
excessive amount of change orders. Moreover, a surety could review
the documents to assess the level of risk for its principal and charge a
premium for its exposure in the event of a default.
Another option available to the contractor and surety in response
to a guarantee situation is to demand a narrowly drawn liquidated
damages provision “pertaining only to contractor‐related credits” in an
effort to equitably shift some of the risk back to the owner. A
liquidated amount per construction credit that the contractor fails to
obtain will protect the owner’s interests without unduly burdening the
contractor. Furthermore, and to protect against the mutual waiver
situation, an owner could expressly define liquidated damages as any
recoverable damages under the contract on a green project because
the extent to which consequential damages might be awarded is
inherently difficult under today’s undetermined case law.271
In response to the second issue and aside from performing the
necessary due diligence, the owner and surety could jointly determine
a succession plan for the contractor instead of using the harsh
approach of excluding the green building activities. This succession
plan could include a strategy for continued operations after retirement,
disability or death, or loss due to termination, of management and key
employees. Key employees should be identified, and incentives should
be in place for their retention. A buy‐sell agreement that can be
triggered in the event of owner retirement, disability or death, with
and necessary life insurance in place to fund the agreement should be
in place as well.
Accordingly, all participants in a green building endeavor need to
work together during all aspects of the project to distribute the
appropriate levels of risk that allows all those involved to understand
their obligations while providing a predictable outcome, should a
dispute arise at a later point in time.
associated with a green building where the project becomes a collaborative approach. See Prum
VELJ, supra note 143, at 5–6.
271. See Prum & Del Percio 2, supra note 147, at 113. This is especially important in the
presence of a mutual waiver of consequential damages. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Green construction projects, though subject to the same or similar
risks as those inherent to conventional construction projects, differ in
substantive ways.272 The owner’s expectations may be more singular
in a green building project than would otherwise occur due to either
the need to meet eligibility criteria for tax credits or other financial
incentives or the intrinsic desire to meet a self‐imposed standard of
outcomes.273 This means that disputes with architects and/or
contractors over green building projects may be more likely than with
traditional projects.274
In light of these issues, the overriding method to ensure that an
owner receives a green building certified by a third party organization
requires the inclusion of the applicable standards into a performance
specification. With this requirement in place, the language used in the
performance bond and standard forms supplied by the AIA, EJCDC, and
ConsensusDOCS will most likely comply with an owner’s sustainability
objectives.
However, should an owner allow the use of
ConsensusDOCS’ Green Building Addendum or the additional language
supplied by the SFAA and NASBP, the obligation now changes to the
delivery of only a building by the surety.
Consequently, all participants engaging in constructing a green
building must review their underlying and supplemental construction
documents and agreements with counsel to determine the proper
outcome and level of comfort with the given risks for a particular
project.

272. See Prum & Del Percio 1, supra note 7, at 104.
273. Id.
274. Id.

